

Zwei Glückliche. - Wahrlich, dieser Mensch, trotz seiner Jugend, versteht sich auf die Improvisation des Lebens und setzt auch den feinsten Beobachter in Erstaunen - es scheint nämlich, daß er keinen Fehlgriff tut, ob er schon fortwährend das gewagteste Spiel spielt. Man wird an jene improvisierenden Meister der Tonkunst erinnert, denen auch der Zuhörer eine göttliche Unfehlbarkeit der Hand zuschreiben möchte, trotzdem, daß sie sich hier und da vergreifen, wie jeder Sterbliche sich vergreift. Aber sie sind geübt und erfinderisch, und im Augenblick immer bereit, den zufälligsten Ton, wohin ein Wurf des Fingers, eine Laune sie treibt, sofort in das thematische Gefüge einzuordnen und dem Zufalle einen schönen Sinn und eine Seele einzuhauchen. - Hier ist ein ganz anderer Mensch: dem mißrät im Grunde alles, was er will und plant. Das, woran er gelegentlich sein Herz gehängt hat, brachte ihn schon einige Male an den Abgrund und in die nächste Nähe des Unterganges; und wenn er dem noch entwischte, so doch gewiß nicht nur »mit einem blauen Auge«. Glaubt ihr, daß er darüber unglücklich ist? Er hat längst bei sich beschlossen, eigene Wünsche und Pläne nicht so wichtig zu nehmen. »Gelingt mir dies nicht«, so redet er sich zu, »dann gelingt mir vielleicht jenes; und im ganzen weiß ich nicht, ob ich nicht meinem Mißlingen mehr zu Danke verpflichtet bin als irgendwelchem Gelingen. Bin ich dazu gemacht, eigensinnig zu sein und die Hörner des Stieres zu tragen? Das, was mir Wert und Ergeb-

nis des Lebens ausmacht, liegt woanders; mein Stolz und ebenso mein Elend liegt woanders. Ich weiß mehr vom Leben, weil ich so oft daran war, es zu verlieren; und eben darum habe ich mehr vom Leben als ihr alle!»

Kurze Gewohnheiten. - Ich liebe die kurzen Gewohnheiten und halte sie für das unschätzbare Mittel, viele Sachen und Zustände kennenzulernen, und hinab bis auf den Grund ihrer süßen und Bitterkeiten; meine Natur ist ganz für kurze Gewohnheiten eingerichtet, selbst in den Bedürfnissen ihrer leiblichen Gesundheit und überhaupt, soweit ich nur sehen kann: vom Niedrigen bis zum Höchsten. Immer glaube ich, dies werde mich nun dauernd befriedigen - auch die kurze Gewohnheit hat jenen Glauben der Leidenschaft, den Glauben an die Ewigkeit - und ich sei zu beneiden, es gefunden und erkannt zu haben: und nun nährt es mich am Mittage und am Abende und verbreitet eine tiefe Genügsamkeit um sich und in mich hinein, so daß mich nach anderem nicht verlangt, ohne daß ich zu vergleichen oder zu verachten oder zu hassen hätte. Und eines Tages hat es seine Zeit gehabt: die gute Sache scheidet von mir, nicht als etwas, das mir nun Ekel einflößte - sondern friedlich und an mir gesättigt, wie ich an ihm, und wie als ob wir einander dankbar sein müßten und uns so die Hände zum Abschied reichten. Und schon wartet das Neue an der Türe, und ebenso mein Glaube - der unver-

wüstliche Tor und Weise! - dies Neue werde das Rechte, das letzte Rechte sein. so geht es mir mit Speisen, Gedanken, Menschen, Städten, Gedichten, Musiken, Lehren, Tagesordnungen, Lebensweisen. - Dagegen hasse ich die dauernden Gewohnheiten und meine, daß ein Tyrann in meine Nähe kommt und daß meine Lebensluft sich verdickt, wo die Ereignisse sich so gestalten, daß dauernde Gewohnheiten daraus mit Notwendigkeit zu wachsen scheinen: zum Beispiel durch ein Amt, durch ein beständiges Zusammensein mit denselben Menschen, durch einen festen Wohnsitz, durch eine einmalige Art Gesundheit. Ja, ich bin allem meinem Elend und Kranksein, und was nur immer unvollkommen an mir ist - im untersten Grunde meiner Seele erkenntlich gesinnt, weil dergleichen mir hundert Hintertüren läßt, durch die ich den dauernden Gewohnheiten entinnen kann. - Das Unerträglichste freilich, das eigentlich Fürchterliche, wäre mir ein Leben ganz ohne Gewohnheiten, ein Leben, das fortwährend die Improvisation verlangt - dies wäre meine Verbannung und mein Sibirien.

Aus: Nietzsche, Friedrich: *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*. Diverse Ausgaben.

5.8.1.3 Subjektive Distanz, Weite des Gegenwartsfensters und zeitliche Abschwächung semantischer Schemen

Manche Situationen erfordern Planung und Kontrolle. Man

denke etwa an den Straßenverkehr: Führt man mit dem Auto durch eine verkehrsreiche Innenstadt, muss man ständig das Verhalten der anderen Verkehrsteilnehmer vorausschauend einplanen und dabei gleichzeitig die eigene Geschwindigkeit und Straßenposition im Auge behalten. Es versteht sich von selbst, dass es dabei unangemessen wäre, sich mit dem Blick eines Künstlers in das Spiel aus Farbe, Klang und Bewegung zu vertiefen. All das ist unbedeutend, es geht sozusagen nur ums „Überleben“ oder zumindest um Schadensbegrenzung. Bei anderen Gelegenheiten ist es genau umgekehrt. Der improvisierende Jazz- Saxophonist wird nur dann ein wirklich beeindruckendes Solo zustandebringen, wenn er sich vollends in seinem Spiel verliert. Natürlich muss auch er Tonlage und Tempo der Begleitung kontrollieren und darauf aufbauend eigene Melodiesequenzen planen, doch im Gegensatz zum Autofahrer geht es bei ihm nicht darum, der Umgebung durch eine innere Distanzierung „standzuhalten“. Vielmehr muss er ansprechbar sein, sich von ihr durchdringen und befruchten lassen. Ansonsten wird sein Spiel nur mechanisch wirken.

Aus: Metzner, Michael Stefan: *ZEIT UND AMBIGUITÄT. Zeitpsychologische Grundlagen und Studien mit mehrdeutigem Material*, Dissertation, Eigenverlag 2002. S. 92-93.

It is known that in the *Torless* film large segments of Musil's early

novel were incorporated into the dialogue almost unchanged. They are considered superior to the lines by the scriptwriters, which no living person would ever utter, and which in the meantime have been ridiculed by American critics. In their own way, however, Musil's sentences also tend to sound artificial as soon as they are heard, not read. This may be to some extent the fault of the novel which incorporates a type of rationalistic casuistry into the internal movement of its text under the guise of a psychology that the more progressive Freudian psychology of the period exposed as a rationalization. Nevertheless, this is hardly the whole point. The artistic difference between the media is obviously still greater than expected by those who feel able to avoid bad prose by adapting good prose. Even when dialogue is used in a novel, the spoken word is not directly spoken but is rather distanced by the act of narration – perhaps even by the typography – and thereby abstracted from the physical presence of living persons. Thus, fictional characters never resemble their empirical counterparts no matter how minutely they are described. In fact, it may be due to the very precision of their presentation that they are removed even further from empirical reality; they become aesthetically autonomous. Such distance is abolished in film: to the extent that a film is realistic, the semblance of immediacy cannot be avoided. As a result, phrases justified by the diction of narrative which distinguishes them from the false everydayness of mere reportage, sound pompous and inauthentic in film. Film, therefore, must search for other means of conveying immediacy: improvisation which systemati-

cally surrenders itself to unguided chance should rank high among possible alternatives.

Adorno, Theodor W.: *Transparencies on film*. In: *The culture industry*. Routledge, London/New York 1991. S. 179.

One encounters at this point an analysis in the same style as that of Jakobson. The literality of the poem is established by recurrence in time (rhythm) and in space (pattern). Literally, its meaning is its pattern or its integrity. The internal verbal relations absorb the variability of the sign's external meaning to some extent: 'So literature in its descriptive context is a body of hypothetical verbal structures' (79). Frye, it is true, introduces a moderately different factor, onto which our own reflections will be grafted: 'The unity of a poem,' he says, 'is ... a unity of mood' (80); 'Poetic images ... express or articulate the mood' (81). Now the mood 'is the poem, not something else still behind it' (ibid.). All literary structure is ironic in this sense: "What it says" is always different in kind or degree from "what it means" (ibid.). Such, then, is poetic structure, 'a self-contained "texture"' (82) – that is, a structure entirely dependent on its internal relationships. I would be loath to leave this case against reference without pointing to the epistemological argument, which, while augmenting the linguistic argument (for example, Jakobson) and the argument of literary criticism (for example, Frye), at the same time

reveals their hidden presupposition. Critiques shaped by the school of logical positivism state that all language that is not descriptive, in the sense of giving information about facts, must be emotional. Furthermore, the suggestion is that what is 'emotional' is sensed purely 'within' the subject and is not related in any way whatsoever to anything outside the subject. Emotion is an affect which has only an inside, and not an outside.

[S. 267-268 Metaphor and Reference]

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It is worth noting the occurrences of the word *phusis* in the *Poetics*, as these constitute a network replete with allusion pointing beyond that work. *Mimêsis* is the first thing to be mentioned if one is to follow 'the natural order' (1447 a 12); here, 'nature' designates the division of knowledge according to the order of things, in virtue of which imitation is to be found in the orbit of the sciences of 'making.' The concept of *telos* occasions an indirect allusion to nature: 'It is the action in it, i.e. its Fable or Plot, that is the end and purpose of tragedy' (1450 a 22). In a slightly less allusive fashion it is said that 'the first essential [*arkhê*], the life and soul [*psukhê*], so to speak, of Tragedy is the Plot' (1450 a 38), whereas thought and character are the 'natural causes' of the actions (1450 a 1). As for imitation itself, it is linked to nature in that 'Imitation is natural [*sumphoton*] to man' (1448 b 5); moreover, man is distinct from the animals in that 'he is the most imitative of creatures' (*ibid.* 7). It is nature again that among men distinguishes the most gifted artists (mastery of

metaphor 'is a sign of genius [*euphuia*],' 1459 a 7); indeed, poets take up comedy or tragedy as their own natures dictate (1449 a 15). Finally, among all the poetic genres, the development of tragedy, which is born in improvisation and is thus in continuity with nature, culminates at a certain point when it attains 'its natural form' (1449 a 15). Furthermore, the characteristics of order, of completeness (*teleion*), of symmetry – in brief, everything that makes of a tragedy a perfect composition, something whole in itself – at the same time reveal 'the limit ... set by the actual nature of the thing' (1451 a 9). Thus the concept of nature, although not thematized as such in the *Poetics*, returns repeatedly as an operational concept (in E. Fink's sense of this opposition).

Aus: Riceur: *The Rule of Metaphor*, Routledge, London/New York 1975, S. 394

In the culture industry the individual is an illusion not merely because of the standardization of the means of production. He is tolerated only so long as his complete identification with the generality is unquestioned. Pseudo individuality is rife: from the standardized jazz improvisation to the exceptional film star whose hair curls over her eye to demonstrate her originality. What is individual is no more than the generality's power to stamp the accidental detail so firmly that it is accepted as such.

The defiant reserve or elegant appearance of the individual on show is mass-produced like Yale locks, whose only difference can be measured in fractions of millimeters. The peculiarity of the self is a monopoly commodity determined by society; it is falsely represented as natural. It is no more than the moustache, the French accent, the deep voice of the woman of the world, the Lubitsch touch: finger prints on identity cards which are otherwise exactly the same, and into which the lives and faces of every single person are transformed by the power of the generality. Pseudo individuality is the prerequisite for comprehending tragedy and removing its poison: only because individuals have ceased to be themselves and are now merely centers where the general tendencies meet, is it possible to receive them again, whole and entire, into the generality. In this way mass culture discloses the fictitious character of the "individual" in the bourgeois era, and is merely unjust in boasting on account of this dreary harmony of general and particular. The principle of individuality was always full of contradiction. Individuation has never really been achieved. Self-preservation in the shape of class has kept everyone at the stage of a mere species being. Every bourgeois characteristic, in spite of its deviation and indeed because of it, expressed the same thing: the harshness of the competitive society. The individual who supported society bore its disfiguring mark; seemingly free, he was actually the product of its economic and social apparatus. Power based itself on the prevailing conditions of power when it sought the approval of persons affected by it.

Aus: Sullivan, Mark: *THE CULTURE INDUSTRY: ENLIGHTENMENT AS MASS DECEPTION*. Quelle: <http://www.msu.edu/user/sullivan/TangCritTheoryAdornoCultInd.html>. S. 37-38.

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Pro domo nostra. - Als während des vorigen Krieges, der wie jeder gegenüber dem darauffolgenden als friedlich erscheint, den Symphonieorchestern vieler Länder der bramarbasierende Mund gestopft war, schrieb Strawinsky die *Histoire du Soldat* für eine spärliche, schockhaft lädierte Kammerbesetzung. Sie wurde seine beste Partitur, das einzig stichhaltige surrealistische Manifest, in dessen konvulsivisch-traumhaftem Zwang der Musik etwas von der negativen Wahrheit aufging. Die Voraussetzung des Stückes war Armut: es demonstrierte so drastisch die offizielle Kultur, weil mit deren materiellen Gütern auch ihre kulturfeindliche Ostentation ihm versperrt war. Darin liegt ein Hinweis für die geistige Produktion nach diesem Krieg, der in Europa ein Maß an Zerstörung zurückgelassen hat, von dem selbst die Löcher jener Musik nichts sich träumen ließen. Fortschritt und Barbarei sind heute als Massenkultur so verfilzt, daß einzig barbarische Askese gegen diese und den Fortschritt der Mittel das Unbarbarische wieder herzustellen vermöchte. Kein Kunstwerk, kein Gedanke hat eine Chance zu überleben, dem nicht die Absage an den falschen Reichtum und die

erstklassige Produktion, an Farbenfilm und Fernsehen, an Millionärsmagazine und Toscanini innewohnte. Die älteren, nicht auf Massenproduktion berechneten Medien gewinnen neue Aktualität: die des Unerfaßten und der Improvisation. Sie allein könnten der Einheitsfront von Trust und Technik ausweichen. In einer Welt, in der längst die Bücher nicht mehr aussehen wie Bücher, sind es nur noch solche, die keine mehr sind. Stand am Anfang der bürgerlichen Ära die Erfindung der Druckerpresse, so wäre bald deren Widerruf durch Mimeographie fällig, das allein angemessene, das unauffällige Mittel der Verbreitung.

Aus: Adorno, Theodor W.: *Minima Moralia*. Reflexionen aus dem beschädigten Leben. Quelle: http://www.montage.theorie.de/index_resources/theory/texte_kritische_theorie/adorno_minmoral.html. S.11.

Il y a des mouvements que l'escrimeur sait faire ; mais, pour forcer un peu la vitesse et en quelque sorte pour se dépasser lui-même, il faut qu'il délivre l'animal, à tous risques. C'est comme une colère d'un court moment, d'abord préparée par l'attitude et les mouvements, et puis lâchée comme un coup de fusil. Mais il est d'expérience aussi que les mouvements laissés à la colère se dérèglent bientôt. Aussi voit-on que la colère éloquente va par courts accès, interrompus par la réflexion et la reprise de soi. Au reste il est clair que, dès que l'on fait une action nouvelle, on ne sait pas si on la fera,

ni comment. Aussi la peur précède la vraie improvisation, et la colère l'accompagne toujours.

Aus: Alain, (Émile Chartier): *Éléments de philosophie*. 1916. S. 221.

To realize this, we must turn back to the phenomenon of speech and put into question the usual accounts which immobilize thought and speech, and make anything other than external relations between them inconceivable. We must recognize first of all that thought, in the speaking subject, is not a representation, that is, that it does not expressly posit objects or relations. The orator does not think before speaking, nor even while speaking; his speech is his thought. In the same way the listener does not form concepts on the basis of signs. The orator's 'thought' is empty while he is speaking and, when a text is read to us, provided that it is read with expression, we have no thought marginal to the text itself, for the words fully occupy our mind and exactly fulfil our expectations, and we feel the necessity of the speech. Although we are unable to predict its course, we are possessed by it. The end of the speech or text will be the lifting of a spell. It is at this stage that thoughts on the speech or text will be able to arise. Previously the speech was improvised and the text understood without the intervention of a single thought; the sense was everywhere present, and nowhere posited for its own sake. The speaking subject does not think of the sense of what he is saying, nor

does he visualize the words which he is using. To know a word or a language is, as we have said, not to be able to bring into play any pre-established nervous network. But neither is it to retain some 'pure recollection' of the word, some faded perception.

Aus: Merleau-Ponty, Maurice: *The Body as Expression, and Speech*. In: *Phenomenology of Perception*. Routledge, London/New York 1958. S. 209.

Art, performing

Some works, such as plays and pieces of classical music, are created as instructions (either notated or implicit in an exemplar) for performers; performances of such pieces arise from the appropriate execution of those instructions. Because the instructions do not specify all features possessed by an accurate performance, performers inevitably contribute something to the performance; even ideally accurate performances differ in the interpretations they offer. Some such works serve primarily to highlight the performer's talents. Even where this is not so, some awareness of what is involved in rendering a piece is necessary to appreciate a work written for performance, since the skills and techniques of performance are the artistic media through which the work's contents are presented. Performances are evaluated for the life, integrity and interest of their interpretations, as well as for their accuracy. The desirability of one performance over another relates partly to the knowledge and experience of the intend-

ed audience. Other works, such as films, involve performance in their creation rather than in their transmission. If these works are multiple, they are so because copies are cloned from a master. When completed, such pieces are not performed or interpreted; they are shown or displayed. Free improvisation might stand as performance in its own right, being neither the creation of a work nor an instance of one. The criteria in terms of which improvisations are evaluated differ from those involved in the creation or transmission of works, taking into account the fact that the improviser's efforts involve the risks, as well as the delights, of spontaneity.

1 Arts involving performance

The performing arts include theatre, dance and other forms of movement, opera, film and television, as well as instrumental and vocal music. Some performing arts are now lost - sagas, narrative poetry and storytelling, for instance; others are marginal as performing arts - poetry, for example. Some activities that include performance are not counted among the arts, such as circus, striptease and televised advertisements.

2 Works for performance

In the case of works created for performance, artists (such as playwrights, composers, choreographers and authors) produce either

instructions (in oral form, or in the form of a script or score) that performers execute or a model instance that they emulate in delivering instances of the works. A work for performance is complete when its score, script or model is complete. Such pieces are instantiated in their various performances. The works are distinct from their performances; they have been variously characterized as universals, types, kinds or classes (see Art works, ontology of §2). Pieces represented by a score or script might never be performed; that is, they might have no instances. Theorists sometimes distinguish performance for an audience from rehearsal, practising or private enactments. What should be acknowledged is that the activity takes its point from generating and publicly transmitting instances of given works. In the case of works for performance, artists' instructions should be interpreted in light of the relevant performance practices; what can be presupposed might not be mentioned or notated, despite its being required, and not all that is mentioned or notated will be mandatory. To perform a work, performers typically produce an instance of the work by following the artist's instructions or model, or by copying other performances derived from those. (If a gust of wind by chance produces a sound acoustically indistinguishable from some performance of a Beethoven symphony, that sound-event would neither be a performance nor would it otherwise instantiate Beethoven's work.) A performance of a given work that contains some departures from the artist's instructions might still be regarded as a performance of that work, provided the work remains recognizable in the performance. To

the extent that it diverges (whether this is intended by the performer or not) from the artist's determinative instructions, a performance is inaccurate or unauthentic as an account of the artist's work. The relevant conventions and artists' notations underspecify or do not determine many of the features displayed in a performance of the work, and where performers emulate a model instance, the realization of many details is by convention left at their discretion. Where performers are left free, they are constrained only by the wider conventions of style or genre. The level of the performer's creative autonomy varies within and between the performing arts; jazz dancers have more liberty in their actions than do ballerinas. But, even in those performing arts that provide highly detailed instructions, many crucial choices are left to performers; for instance, many aspects of speech delivery and gesture are not indicated by the playwright. It is by their treatment of those matters on which performers are free that equally faithful (but different) interpretations are distinguished. A single interpretation or production might receive more than one performance. Though the work is distinct from the score, script or model instance produced by the artist, I hold that the identity of the work derives from the instructions notated or implicit in the model. These, in turn, are identified in relation to the artist and the period of creation. In that case, one cannot perform the work except by performing it as its creator's, and doing this requires faithfulness in the relevant respects (as determined by artistic conventions of the genre at the time) to the instructions produced by the artist. A performance

can instantiate a given work only if it is faithful or authentic to the appropriate degree. I claim that we are interested in performances primarily as performances of artists' works and that this is how they are advertised and represented. (This is not to say, though, that we shun works from unknown provenances; a speculative account of a work consistent with the conventions of its time usually provides something worth considering, if not definitively its artist's work.) The history of its performances and the constitution of the intended audience also are relevant in assessing the degree of faithfulness appropriate for a performance, as Jerrold Levinson has argued (1987). The first performance of a work should aim at a high degree of faithfulness, as should a performance directed at novices. Where works are well known, as are Shakespeare's plays in the West, much of the performer's duty of faithfulness has been discharged already; other desiderata, such as contemporary relevance, novelty and verve, become more prominent. Performances are evaluated in terms of the life, coherence, variety and interest they bring to the work, and these features are relative to the audience's prior experience of that work or similar ones, as well as to the materials furnished by the work's creator. Stan Godlovitch (1993) specifies the following conditions for the integrity of live performances: only one work is performed at a time; its proper sequence is respected, as is the indicated rate of delivery; the performance is continuous, without unjustified breaks; performers comply with the appropriate roles (and do not, for example, swap parts midway through the work). Also, the audience should

be in a position to receive the entire performance in every detail. Note that such conditions are required by the view presented earlier: the primary aim of performance is to deliver the artist's work, as specified, to an audience.

3 The centrality of the performer

That artists need the services of performers in instancing their work is not to say merely that performers are means for the work's transmission. The foundry workers who follow the sculptor's instructions and the film's projectionist help to create or transmit the work, but theirs is not the pivotal role of the performer. They might be replaced by technologically superior alternatives without thereby altering the artistic character of the statue or film, whereas the performer's task is ineliminably part of works created for performance. Artists work with media; the appreciation of art requires the audience to be aware of the limits and possibilities of the media employed. In the performing arts, the requirements of performance are part of the medium in which artists operate. Artists do not create works that happen to be performed; rather, they write for performance, taking into account what will be involved for performers when they produce the outcome. (So it is that a new, though derivative, piece results when a musical work is transcribed for instruments different from those specified for the original.) Just as the viewers of a painting consider not only what it represents, but also its surface and the

manner of its representation, so audiences in the performing arts consider the artist's use of the performers and their props or tools. They should be aware, for instance, that a dance depicts the death of a swan, that a given actor is playing the parts of several characters and that organists use their feet as well as their hands. Many works for performance employ the performer's skills in order to achieve narrative, expressive, formal or other effects. These, rather than the performer's activity, are the proper focus of appreciative concern, even if that concern involves an awareness of the connection between the artist's instructions, the performer's efforts and the artistic result. In other pieces, though, the artistic point of the work is to highlight the expertise and techniques of the performer. This is the case with works providing virtuosic roles for one or two performers; some genres, such as the concerto and étude, are of this kind. As Thomas Carson Mark suggests (1980), such pieces are about the talents required to perform them; the audience's fullest appreciation requires a recognition of the difficulties overcome by the performer in making the rendition seem effortless. Combining the points just made with the earlier emphasis on the relation between the work's identity and its means of performance, it is possible to see why the tools, techniques and skills of the performer come to be valued and preserved in their own right, sometimes despite the availability of simpler alternatives. If a new ballet shoe were capable of doubling the height of a dancer's leap, it would not be appropriate for dancers to wear the new shoes for performances of nineteenth-century ballets; even if exaggerated

elevation is a desirable feature in such works, the difficulty of achieving that elevation is also part of those works. Similarly, the programmed synthesizer is no substitute for the violin when it comes to performing Bach's Partitas, even if it exactly reproduces the sound of a violin. It is not surprising, then, that musicians, dancers and actors of the past formed guilds, not only to train novices but also to keep secret the tricks of their crafts. Contemporary performers are expected to maintain the required standards. The central place of artistic skill and creativity in performances helps to explain the distinction between, on the one hand, the disc jockey or ink-printer and, on the other, the performer. The former might be involved in delivering a work of art to an audience, but their roles lack the particular skills for which artists plan the shapes of their works. Tragedies are written for actors and concertos are written for pianists, but films are not made for projectionists and bronzes are not made for casters. Thus it is sometimes said that performers are artists' collaborators, not their servants.

4 Works made through performance

By contrast with pieces created for performance, some kinds of art involve performance not in instantiating the work but, rather, as an essential element in its creation. This is typically the case in cinema. Unlike a play, a movie is not completed as a work when it is scripted; movies must be made, and performers contribute to this

process. Once finished, the cinematic work is screened, not performed. The cinematic art work is the master print, which is multiply instantiated by prints cloned from it. The same is also true for some kinds of music, such as electronic pieces that use tapes of the voice or instruments as their source material; the work is the finished master tape and the copies made from it. An interesting puzzle is raised by popular music, in which discs derived from the master have a dominant status and 'performances' frequently involve 'lip- and hand-synching' to recordings. (Multi-tracking might preclude genuine live performance.) Is the importance of these recordings a sign that they are definitive of the work? If so, artists' rerecordings of their own compositions result in new works, not merely in new performances. Alternatively, is it that the recording is a model instance that may be performed live? In that case, the recording is the more important, not because it is that work's only instance, but because it sets the standard for the work's subsequent performances. (Or are these questions redundant, because the piece has become the music video, which has superseded the audio tape?)

5 Performance in the absence of works

So far I have concentrated on the connection between performances and art works, but performances might take place in the absence of works, as is sometimes the case with street theatre. Dancers might dance without making an instance of any work, or

thespians might act without performing a play or making a film. Where there is no work to be followed, the content of the performance is improvised. While there is much to appreciate that is common to both improvised performances and performances of works, there also are differences to be recognized, as Philip Alperson has noted (1984). Obviously one cannot criticize free improvisers for lack of faithfulness to artists' specifications, since they follow none. (There can be mistakes in improvisation, however, when, for example, conventions of the adopted style are violated.) Spontaneity and inventiveness are valued in improvisation; meanwhile, some looseness of structure and lack of polish are less blameworthy in an improvised performance than in one in which such factors are produced by the artist or result after hours of rehearsal. And where there is common ground for appreciation the basis for evaluations can differ. Both improvisations and works for performance might be enjoyed for their narrative or formal structures, inner harmony or overall beauty, but it is relevant that, in the case of the former, responsibility for the achievement lies solely with the performers, who act freely and do so at the moment of performance. Why not say that improvisation results in a work created by someone who acts both as performer and artist, even if the piece that is the outcome is not itself for performance? The difference between improvisation and the creation of a work through performance does not depend on the number of instances, because an improvisation might be taped and, thereby, duplicated, just as a film might have many prints. The results of

improvisation are not more ephemeral in principle than are works created with the help of performers. The basis for the distinction, I suggest, is a matter of convention - we talk of films as works, yet we do not describe sessions of free improvisation by this term. This way of talking implicitly acknowledges differences in the goals of improvising and of creating permanent works through performance. Why not allow that improvisation results in a model of a work for performance? The answer is as before: improvisation is not conventionally approached as providing a work recipe for others to realize through emulation. An artist might recall and notate a piece that was originally improvised, as J.S. Bach is thought to have done with his Musical Offering, but this shows not that all acts of improvisation simultaneously involve the creation of works for performance but only that a work for performance might be composed through improvisation. It matters that the artist supplies a notation or specifies that the original improvisation be taken as a model performance, for without such indications there is no warrant for regarding the result as the creation or performance of a work.

Aus: Davies, Stephen: Art, performing. In: Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Version 1.0. Routledge, London and New York 1998. S. 592-596.